Impediments to Traditional Logic
There are m any im pediments in the modern philosophical m ind to an understanding of traditional or A ristotelian logic. These im pedim ents would, of course, be considered errors by a defender of traditional logic. A t any rate, they prevent us from understanding traditional logic as the traditional logicians themselves understood it. The removal of these im pedim ents is not possible unless they are recognized. Our purpose here will be to enum erate these impediments in an orderly way, so th a t we can come to a full awareness of the difficulty of making a profound, or even a correct, approach to trad i tional logic in our time.
We have in mind impediments to the whole of logic. Im pedim ents to the whole of a science, as distinguished from those th a t affect a p a rt only, can pertain either to the end and purpose of th a t science, or to its subject, or to the proper m ethod and way of learning it. Hence, our consideration of the im pedim ents to traditional logic will be divided into three parts. The order is clear since the end is always m ost im portant in those things which are for the sake of an end, and the subject of a science is the proper principle for determining the m ethod appropriate to th a t science. However, to make clear the nature of these impediments, we shall have to develop a t some length m any points about the subject and m ethod of traditional logic. Our consid eration of these points and of the im pediments opposed to them should be considered no more th a n an outline of the problems facing those who would understand and defend traditional logic in our day. I t goes w ithout saying th a t such a brief outline will be of im mediate use only to those who possess a deep knowledge of traditional logic through the great com mentators on the Organon and the Isagoge. However, it is hoped th a t this outline will serve to guide and even stim ulate traditional logicians to a deeper knowledge of their science and to a more adequate presentation and defense of it in the con tem porary intellectual environm ent.
The most fundam ental im pedim ent to the end of traditional logic is found in those modern logicians who regard logic as w orthy of being studied for its own sake. Logic was never adm itted into theoretical philosophy by the traditional logicians, except as its tool.1 A sign of this is th a t the logical works of Aristotle were given the Greek word for tool (organon) as their title.
The second im pedim ent to the end of traditional logic is the opinion of those modern logicians who assert th a t logic has nothing to do with the acts of our reason in particular, because the la tter belong to psychology. B u t the whole purpose of traditional logic was to direct the acts of our reason.1 This does n o t mean, of course, th a t the acts of our reason were the subject of traditional logic. The relation of these two will become clear after we have considered the subject of traditional logic.
The third im pedim ent to the end of traditional logic is the denial th a t logic is intrinsically ordered to acquiring knowledge of things, especially the knowledge of what a thing is, and why it is the way it is. An understanding of traditional logic cannot be cut off from all re ference to things.2 How could we understand a tool for knowing things w ithout m aking any reference to things ?
Perhaps the best way to approach the subject of traditional logic is through the acts which it directs. These acts m ust be in need of direction and m ust be dependent upon the same rules for their direc tion. The first clue to understanding the subject of traditional logic is to see th a t not all acts of our reason or intellect can be directed b y the same rules. If we cannot reduce th e direction of all th e acts of our reason or intellect to the same rules, we m ust specify which acts are directed by trad itio n al logic. This investigation is useful for the question of w hether the new logic (whether we call it symbolical or m athem atical or by some other name) is an extension of th e old, or something more inclusive th a n th e old, or something equivocally nam ed logic. If the new logic considers other acts whose direction can be reduced to the same rules, or if the old logic can be reduced to more inclusive rules, then there will be indicated one answer to th a t question. If not, the answer will be different. We shall find, however, m any impediments in th e modern philosophical mind to the approach to the subject of traditional logic through the acts it directs.
We m ay divide all the acts of our intellect or reason into those of the theoretical intellect and those of the practical intellect. No one is ap t to say th a t the direction of these two groups of acts can be reduced to the same rules; yet, let us examine this a b it from the beginning. The theoretical intellect and the practical intellect differ by their ends: the former considers knowledge or tru th for its own sake while the la tter applies or orders knowledge to m aking or doing something. B ut knowledge th a t we can act upon, m ust be based on a composition of means w ith an end actually desired, w ith no separation in the mind of all those things required in the actual making or doing. The theoretical intellect, however, seeks a distinct knowledge of the object by separating things joined in reality, such as a thing and its properties, or even the p arts of a thing's definition.3 Speculative definitions through genus and difference do n o t unite with a concrete end all the means required to achieve it in reality. I t is difficult to see how we could reduce the direction of such diverse acts to the same rules. We can now tu rn to the more difficult question about the theoretical intellect alone.
Can the direction of all the acts of the theoretical intellect be reduced to the same rules ? First, it would be well to note th a t not all acts of the theoretical intellect are in need of direction. Only those acts in which there is a processus or going forth from the known to the unknown (i.e., the acts of reason properly so called) would seem to be in need of direction. I t would be impossible for our intellect to direct itself tow ard the very first notions th a t it requires. These fall into our intellect w ithout any anticipation of them by our then em pty intellect, and are the object of a knowledge more n atural th an subject to art. Since there are no other acts in the theoretical intellect th an those by which we know or come to know (for the end here is simply knowledge), it remains to be seen if all acts by which we come to know something unknown from the known, can be directed by the same rules. If we come to know something b u t not in some way through w hat we know already, we have an act th a t is obviously not subject to direction by art. The acts in question, then, are those by which we proceed from the known to a knowledge of the unknown.
I t m ight now be thought th a t we have come to the end of our investigation, for do not the traditional logicians speak of logic as directing our reason in proceeding from the known to the unknown. St. Albert, for example, in his De Natura Logicae (at the beginning of his commentary on the Predicables) says this over and over again. However, it is precisely here th a t the greatest difficulty is found. We m ight come to this difficulty by bringing in the position of a noted modern logician. Rudolf Carnap, in his Foundations of Logic and Mathematics,1 seems to identify logic w ith " the rules of deduction" 2 and to make " calculation ... a special form of deduction applied to numerical expressions" .3 I t is clear th a t acts of calculation (e.g., addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, etc.) make known some unknown num ber through ones th a t are already known. If traditional logic shows us in w hat way the unknown can be made known through w hat is already known, then it would seem th a t traditional logic m ust also direct calculation. Moreover, this is also seen in the funda m ental act presupposed to calculation: num bering or, in general, measuring. For a measure, as the father of traditional logic himself says, is th a t by which quan tity is made known.4 F urther, the act of counting or numbering is an act of reason which comes to know b it by b it rather than all a t once (like an angelic intellect). Thus, both Aristotle and St. Thomas call numbering an act of reason in the fourth book of the Physics.1 B u t the acts of reason are directed by logic.
On the other hand, the traditional logicians include neither numbering and measuring, nor acts of calculation among those three acts of reason which logic directs. Since counting and calculation are acts of the theoretical reason in th a t they are ordered to knowing, we cannot escape our dilemma by saying th a t the ancients would p u t them w ith the acts of the practical intellect which are definitely excluded from being directed by logic.
W hy, then, did the traditional logicians exclude counting and calculation from the direction supplied by logic? The m an who considers things from their beginning will get the clearest picture of them. Hence, we m ust consider calculation and those three acts of reason th a t are said to p ertain to logic from the beginning. Since the third act of reason presupposes the second act and this, the first (for a justification of this, see St. Thom as' Prooemium to the Posterior Analytics), it is clear th a t logic in this sense m ust begin w ith the first act of reason which is to grasp w hat something is. Now, in calculation, the act which is presupposed to all others is the act of counting or measuring. Carnap himself notes this:
Mathematical calculi with their customary interpretation are distinguished from elementary logical calculi chiefly by the occurrence of numerical expressions. There are two procedures in empirical science which lead to the application of numerical expressions: counting and measurement.2 Thus, the act of measuring or numbering is to all acts of calculation something like the act of grasping-what-something-is is to the second and third acts of reason. N ot only does the first act of reason come before the second and th ird acts, b u t they are also in a way reduced to it. Obvious propositions, as the whole is greater th a n its p art, can be seen when we have grasped w hat the p arts are; in our example, w hat a whole is and w hat a p a rt is. Propositions not obvious are proved most fully through dem onstration whose middle term is a definition. Regardless of w hether the operations of calculation can or cannot be reduced to th a t of measuring or numbering, we can now ask the fundam ental question: can the act of measuring or num bering be reduced to th a t of grasping w hat a thing is, or vice-versa ?
Although we can grasp w hat a measure is and w hat it is to measure something, it does n o t seem th a t we can reduce either of these two acts or operations to the other. Knowing what m an is will not tell you how many men there are in the world, nor will knowing how many men there are in the world enable you to know what m an is. Or, again, knowing what w ater is will not tell you how much w ater is in the world, nor will knowing how much w ater is in the world enable you to grasp what w ater is.
W hy is it th a t neither of these operations can be reduced to the other in the way th a t the second and th ird acts of reason can be reduced to the quod quid erat esse ? Well, if any one could be reduced to the other, it would seem th a t the act of measuring or num bering could be reduced to th a t of grasping w hat a thing is. For the latter is the fundam ental and defining operation of intellect as such. M ore over, even now we can grasp what a measure is and define it; and like wise, we can grasp w hat it is to measure a thing or a m ultitude. B ut, since we grasp or understand w hat something is by abstraction from that whereby it is measurable‫׳‬ , i.e., from th a t whereby it is multiplied numerically or extended p art outside of p a rt; we cannot, through our grasp of w hat a thing is, atta in the measurable m ultitude or quantity of it. If, however, there is an intellect which understands w hat things are w ithout making such abstraction, it can attain their m ultiplicity or q u antity through the same knowledge. From this, we can see why a science based on measurement, as experimental physics, could insist on our not knowing the essence of anything.
Can we conclude th a t the direction of the three acts of reason (simple grasping, composition or division, and reasoning) and th a t of counting and calculation cannot be reduced to the same rules or principles, because the most basic acts in both cannot be reduced to one another? Perhaps, it will be objected im mediately th a t there is already implied in our discussion a rule or principle common to both. This is the principle th a t we should proceed from the known to the unknown. I t is true th a t this principle extends to every proceeding from one thing to another in our theoretical intellect and even to the proceeding from sense to intellect. I t is to be observed, in the proper way of proceeding in each science and in our proceeding from one science to another. In short, it directs the whole proceeding of our theoretical reason. In this way, there is a principle or rule common to both.
B ut w hat kind of a principle is this ? I t is an extremely common principle. In fact, as the principle of non-contradiction is to the conclusion (and even the premises) of all sciences; so the principle of going from the known to the unknown is to every way of proceeding in our theoretical intellect, and also to the passage from sense to intellect. B ut the unity which all science have in the principle of non-contradiction does not destroy the m ultiplicity of sciences which is based on the diverse proper principles of their dem onstrations. Hence, the dependence of every way of proceeding on this most common principle of going from the known to the unknown is not sufficient to say th a t there is one science or a rt or paideia to direct us in every way of proceeding.
This solution is difficult and another likeness will help. We say th a t the proper way of proceeding in each science is determ ined by the subject of th a t science and the relation of our reason to th a t subject. Thus, th e proper principles by which the proper or special ways of proceeding are determ ined are always distinct, since their subjects are always distinct. B ut suppose someone should say th a t the proper ways of proceeding in the sciences are all determ ined by the same principle -the general one stated a t the beginning of this p ara graph. We cannot deny th a t the determ inations of these proper ways of proceeding depend upon this very common principle. Y et the proper principles of these determ inations -the diverse subjects of the sciences and the diverse relations of our reason to them -are n o t the same. This common principle by itself cannot determine any proper way of proceeding. R ather, every proper or special way of proceeding is determ ined by its own principles. Hence, if we find th a t the proper principles of directing the three acts of reason are diverse from those for directing counting and calculation, we shall not expect to find one science or a rt to direct both. We would expect the proper principles to be diverse since they would have to be proportioned to or adapted to acts (grasping w hat a thing is and counting) th a t are not reducible to each other or to any more basic act. In fact, as we shall see later, the direction of the three acts of reason requires the finding of certain relations, called second intentions, based on things understood in the state of being understood. Hence, any other acts whose direction does not require the finding or discovery of such relations cannot pertain to the same a rt or logic. B u t the acts of calculation do not require the finding of such relations. Therefore, they cannot belong to the same a rt to direct. M oreover, the direction afforded by trad i tional logic cannot be separated from words even though words are n ot its principal consideration. This is seen in the great w riters in traditional logic. B u t according to George Boole, one of the fathers of the new logic, " Language is an instrum ent of Logic, b u t not an indispensable instrum ent." 1 This direct contradiction is a sufficient sign th a t the word logic is equivocal here and th a t direction is not being reduced to the same principles.
I t is illum inating to recall th a t the new logic is intim ately associat ed w ith the progress of the modern m athem atical sciences of nature. B ut as the late Charles de Koninck so well pointed out, " it has lately become obvious th a t the giant strides in the m athem atical study of nature are concom itant w ith a gradual em ancipation from 1 the use of words." 1 This is a sign th a t a logic tied up with such a science will be a logic in a quite different sense of the word from the traditional one. Although the new logic can do things th a t the old cannot, it cannot replace the old. I t has, rather, a kind of dependence on the former in th a t " The m athem atician and the m athem atical physicist are only ham pered by the use of words while pursuing their type of knowledge but, when they w ant to convey w hat their know ledge is about, it seem th a t they m ust use them . " 2 The old logic, then, always keeps a priority over the new in th a t the former is used in discussing itself and the new while the new can neither discuss itself, nor the old. I t should be understood th a t, by the new logic, we mean symbolic or m athem atical logic insofar as they are not a mere continuation of the old. Aristotle certainly did n o t complete traditional logic, b u t merely its principal parts, as Ammonius explains a t the beginning of his commentary on the Peri Hermeneias.
We can disengage now the impediments in the modern philo sophical m ind to an approach to the subject of traditional logic by the acts th a t it directs. These impediments are general ones, and we shall meet them often again. There is first of all a confusion in the modern philosophical mind between common and proper principles or, more appropriately, between common rules and proper rules. T his ancient distinction is not too difficult to see in the case of the mechanic al or practical arts. " M ake things out of a m atter which is suitable to their end or purpose" is a common rule in all the mechanical or practical arts. B ut the existence of this very common rule does not make one a rt out of carpentry and the a rt of glassblowing, because the ways in which things are made out of wood and out of glass are not the same. The proper principles or rules of carpentry show us how to make something out of wood, and the proper rules of glassblowing, out of glass. These proper rules are different because they m ust be adapted to m aterials th a t cannot be worked in the same way. Similarly, rules, such as we should go from the known to the unknown, or th a t one thing should follow necessarily from another, are entirely too general to constitute a single a rt for the acts of calculation and the three acts of reason of traditional logic. The proper principles or rules adapted to each set of acts are entirely distinct. This is not, however, to deny all sim ilarity between these two sets of acts. And this brings us to another general impediment.
The modern philosophical mind is not a t all habituated to dis tinguish the kind of likeness th a t is found in the m a tter or subject of a science from the kind of likeness th a t is useful only for leading the student by the hand to see some difficult point. Aristotle was very much aware of the likeness between the acts considered in logic and the acts of calculation. Two examples will suffice for th e moment. W hen naming the syllogism, Aristotle was obviously m aking use of a likeness between the logical act using this instrum ent and the more known act of reckoning or calculating. This is clear to anyone who looks up the Greek word avWoyianos. Another example of Aristotle's awareness of this sim ilarity is seen in the comparison he makes between those deceived by sophistical arguments and those deceived in the m arketplace by experts in managing counting machines.1 Thus, although he saw this sim ilarity or likeness, Aristotle made no attem p t to unite the a rt of calculation w ith logic. The reason for this is th a t he realized th a t not ju st any sim ilarity or likeness is sufficient to have one science or art. If this la tter were true, there would not only be one science of the three acts of logic and the acts of calculation, b u t we would also have to include the acts of the practical intellect, and even those of nature. Dialectic, for example, is in some way like counsel, and St. Thomas can compare the th ird act of reason to the acts of n atu re.2 M oreover, there is a likeness which falls below even th a t which is suitable for leading the student by the hand. Such is the likeness of the m etaphor. T h at the likeness between the acts of calculation and the three acts of traditional logic is not sufficient to found one science has been p artly shown above when it was pointed out th a t the most basic acts in these two sets cannot be reduced to each other, nor to a common act. I t can be seen more clearly, too, after we have considered the basis for the rules of traditional logic.
Since the th ird act of reason depends on the second, and the second, on the first, and since the first is ordered to the second and the second, to the third, it does not make sense to reduce the direction of these three acts to different arts or sciences. Hence, there is one a rt or science which directs us in these three acts so th a t we may proceed orderly, easily, and w ithout error in them. This a rt m ust contain rules by which th a t direction is made possible. Our next question, then, is " W hat are those rules based u p o n ? " I t is precisely here th a t we enter into the great subtlety and difficulty of traditional logic. The basis for these rules cannot be understood ap art from the doctrine of the great traditional logicians so well summarized in the following passage:
Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quia sunt voces significativae... Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis adinvicem et ordinem principiorum adinvicem et ad conclusiones. 1 We cannot think about things w ithout forming thoughts (however vague or distinct) about them, nor can we express these thoughts well to ourselves or to others w ithout using words to signify them. Hence, we cannot think orderly about things w ithout p u ttin g order into our thoughts and into the words th a t signify those thoughts. B ut the passage above indicates more th an this. I t suggests th a t the order in our thoughts and the order in the words which are signs of those thoughts are in some way the cause of order in our thinking.
We m ust consider more carefully this strange dependence of the act of reason upon the term it produces. We can show the existence of this dependence by an induction. W hy do we form definitions ? So th a t we m ay know distinctly w hat things are (in the case of defini tion in the strict sense). If we could know this w ithout definitions, we would not form them. W hy do we form enunciations ? So th a t we can know the true and the false. We do not seem to be able to know the true or the false except in the enunciation where they are found. W hy do we form syllogisms ? Because we cannot know certain pro positions w ithout so doing. Thus, we define dem onstration as a syllogismus faciens scire, etc.
T hat this dependence of the act of reason upon the term it pro duces is a strange one can be seen when we ask w hat kind of dependence is here involved; i.e., to which of the four genera of causes should we reduce it ? Although we have used the word making (faciens) above, this need not indicate the agent cause. The word making is carried over to the other causes; e.g., the virtue of a m an makes him to be virtuous, formally speaking. Since the acts produce the concepts, we can hardly consider the dependence of the acts upon the concepts as being in the genus of agent cause. N or can the dependence of the acts upon the concepts refer to cause in the sense of end or purpose, for the act is always the end of the concept produced; we form defini tions for the sake of knowing distinctly w hat a thing is. Hence, as a corollary, the act of thinking cannot be classified as a productive act essentially, since the end of the la tter is always the thing produced. Finally, it is manifest th a t the term of the act is not the m atter of the act, th a t out of which the act is made. I t remains to p u t the dependence of the act upon the term produced in the genus of formal cause. Indeed, if knowing is defined as becoming other as other, which the concept produced makes possible, then the dependence would seem to be on th a t which completes the definition -the formal cause. Since the concept is a cause per modum objecti, we m ight consider it an extrinsic formal cause.
This kind of cause is very strange and difficult to understand, so th a t some m anududio is in order. The best th a t we can come up w ith is the following. The order in our concepts or thoughts can be compared to the order in a magnitude such as a road; and our thinking can be compared to the movement over this magnitude, or along this road. Hence, ju st as the order, or the before and after in the road is a cause of the before and after in the m ovement over its length; so the order in our thoughts is a cause of order in our thinking of them. B ut the order and the continuity in the road can only be an extrinsic formal cause of the order and continuity in the movement over it. Likewise, the same will be true of the order in our thoughts to the order in our thinking. This likeness, which is drawn from the sixth book of the Physics, was seen by Aristotle who carried over the word road from sensible things to logic.
The above tex t would also seem to indicate th a t we cannot p u t order into our thoughts or concepts w ithout p u ttin g order into the words th a t signify those thoughts. This interpretation of traditional logic is confirmed by the way in which the consideration of words was regarded as necessary in th a t logic. The student, of course, has a special dependence on the order of his teacher's words.
Logic, in the above text, was seen to be tied in w ith the dependence of the acts of reason upon the term s produced by them . Logic m ust help our reason in the form ation of definitions, enunciations, syllo gisms, etc., and, after their formation, in the judgm ent of their good ness or badness. B ut, in w hat way does logic help reason in these formations, or in w hat way is logic a cause of these formations ? In the above text, St. Thomas speaks of reason as making, b u t to logic he attributes only consideration of the order in our thoughts and words. Can we also speak of logic as m aking definitions, etc. ? I t might, seem so since we call logic an art. Moreover, is n o t logic a tool of reason in the form ation of definitions, etc., as the title of Aristotle's logical works indicates? B u t a tool is in the genus of agent cause. We would answer th a t logic does indeed help reason in the formation of divisions, definitions, enunciations, syllogisms, etc. B ut it helps reason, not in the way th a t a hammer and saw help a carpenter make a chair, b u t more in the way th a t a blueprint helps the carpenter. This second way is reduced to the genus of formal cause -extrinsic formal cause or exemplar -rath er th a n to agent cause. W hen logic is called a tool or an art, this is a very broad sense of those words. A tool here means anything by which we make in any sense whatever. Directions can in this sense be considered a tool. A rt means any ordinatio by which hum an acts arrive a t their end through determ inate means. Logic is a cause of the formation of divisions, definitions, etc., insofar as it gives rules to be observed in their formation.
We m ust next investigate the nature of th e rules th a t belong to logic. The fundam ental question here is w hether those rules are discovered or invented by our reason. This question is tied in with another: w hat composes these rules? I t should not remain hidden to us, th a t rules invented by reason need not be arbitrary. They can be suitable to a given end and consistent w ith one another, as are the rules of baseball or football. We call rules invented because either the end of them is chosen by us (rather th an exists by nature), or the end does not necessarily require those rules, or for both of these reasons. W hen both an end and the rules for directing us to th a t end are not subject to our choice, b u t are determ ined by our nature, then we have rules th a t are not invented, b u t which can only be found or discovered.
Rudolf Carnap speaks of the rules of logic as invented in the above sense. L et us quote his own sum m ary:
The result of our discussion is the following: logic or the rules of deduction (in our terminology, the syntactical rules of transformation) can be chosen arbitrarily and hence are conventional if they are taken as the basis of the construction of the language system and if the interpretation of the system is later superimposed. On the other hand, a system of logic is not a matter of choice, but either right or wrong, if an interpretation of the logical signs is given in advance. But even here, conventions are of funda mental importance; for the basis on which logic is constructed: namely, the interpretation of the logical signs (e.g., by a determination of truth conditions) can be freely chosen.1
Regardless of w hat the word logic m ay refer to in C arnap's vocabulary, it is our belief th a t the word was used in traditional logic for something whose rules had a basis th a t could not be chosen. These rules arise necessarily in the scientific consideration of the subject of logic. This subject is necessarily rooted in our natural (and, hence, not subject to choice) way of understanding by way of abstraction, by going from the confused to the distinct, etc. (A good sum m ary of these elements in our way of understanding is given by St. Thom as in the Prima Pars, q.85.) Hence, it would be a most serious im pedim ent to traditional logic to believe th a t its rules were chosen or invented. However, we should n o t infer th a t traditional logic was based on psychology as such, for the rules of logic are expressed with second intentions which are not p a rt of the subject of psychology. Of course, psychology cannot be irrelevant to an a rt th a t directs the three acts of reason. Yet it (psychology) does not supply the proper principles of logic which are, as we have said, second intentions.
I t is now tim e to move to a consideration of second intentions (and the impediments opposed to them) which we have purposively left until this point. We can arrive a t second intentions by dividing them from other relations. This text is useful for th a t purpose:
Dicendum quod sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere: uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellec tum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit conside rando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem. Alio modo secundum quod huiusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod intellectus intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum ordinem intellectus non adinveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi. E t huiusmodi relationes in tellectus non attribuit ei quod est in intellectu, sed ei quod est in re.1
This text throws light upon the question we ju st answered. The rules of logic involve relations such as genus and species -the first of the two kinds of relation considered in this text. These relations are found by reason in considering the order of w hat is in the intellect to things which are outside the intellect, and also the order of things understood to each other. Such considerations are not the business of psychology. These relations, which belong to things understood in the state of being understood, cannot be separated from them in th a t state. B u t it is precisely in this way th a t logic is concerned w ith things. Therefore, the rules of logic m ust involve these relations. I t is these relations th a t were called second intentions by the traditional logicians.
B ut a num ber of serious questions can be raised here about the position of the traditional logicians. W hy should our thinking be directed by rules th a t involve the relations th a t belong to things understood in the state of being understood ? This is really very strange, no m atter how m any times we m ay have heard it. Is it not b etter to base our thinking on w hat belongs to things understood, considered in themselves, rather th an on w hat is extrinsic to them (as is w hat belongs to them in the state of being understood) ?
Two things m ust be pointed out in answer to this question. One is th a t traditional logic itself m aintains th a t dem onstration is more perfect th an dialectic. D em onstration m ust proceed from the proper per se principles of the thing while dialectic proceeds from second intentions which are extrinsic to the thing. B u t this does not mean th a t the p art of logic which considers dem onstration is based on the proper per se principles of each thing about which we can dem onstrate some property. Logic would then have to be every science. R ather, this p a rt of logic considers those second intentions or relations which the proper principles of a thing m ust have in the intellect when we dem onstrate. A nother thing th a t should be pointed out is th a t the direction of our thinking is not entirely reduced to the rules of logic. Logic is only the common way of proceeding in the sciences. Each science requires, in addition to logic, the direction which is supplied by its own proper or special w ay o f proceeding. The latter is based, as we saw before, on the subject of th a t science considered in itself and upon the particular relation of our reason to th a t subject. The direction of our thinking in any given science, then, is dependent both on logic and on th a t science's proper method. Hence, although these two ways of proceeding are not based on the same proper and immediate principles, it would be absurd to ask which set of principles is the correct basis for the rules to direct our thinking. To make a choice between them would am ount to rejecting p a rt of w hat is necessary for the direction of our thinking. W hat is im portant to see about logic is both its necessity for the direction of our thinking in the sciences, and its insufficiency for th a t direction w ithout the proper ways of proceeding. I t is, of course, much easier to see the insufficiency of logic than it is to see its necessity. I t is with the latter point, then, th a t we m ust be especially con cerned.
The necessity of logic has already been touched upon before. If we cannot think about things w ithout forming thoughts about them , we cannot think orderly (or w ith direction) about them w ithout putting order into our thoughts. Since we express things as we under stand them in our thoughts, we cannot p u t order into our thoughts without knowing the order which things understood have in this state to w hat is outside the mind or to each other. B ut it is this latter which logic considers. I t is a m atter of experience th a t this order is rarely or imperfectly found by those ignorant of logic.
We have shown th a t the thing referred to by the word logic as used by the traditional logicians is involved in the dependence of the acts of our reason upon their term s. For the sake of completeness, and because some people think th a t the traditional logicians confused logic with psychology, we m ust inquire whether logic is involved in the dependence of our thinking or acts of reason, upon their principles: the intellect itself, the intelligible species abstracted from the phan tasms, and the intellectual habits such as the sciences. Logic does not seem to be a cause of the intellect for obvious reasons. Nor does it seem to be a cause of the intelligible species coming to be in the possible intellect. The agent intellect and the phantasm s are the cause of this, although in different ways. Hence, logic w ithout experience is useless. Since habits are produced by acts, logic is a cause of in tellectual habits only insofar as it is a cause of the acts. I t is a cause of the acts only insofar as it prescribes the order which should be in our thoughts and in the words signifying those thoughts.
Before we proceed to determ ine more exactly the subject of logic, we should consider the question why these relations which belong to things understood in the state of being understood are called second intentions. This question is answered well by C ajetan in his com m entary on the Isagoge of Porphyry:
Intentio
illa intellectus attentio, qua inspicit in rebus sibi oblatis ea, quae conveniunt illis in rerum natura. Secunda autem intentio dicitur illa intellectus attentio, qua in rebus sibi oblatis intuetur ea, quae conveniunt illis ex intellectus adinventione. Verum, quia occultiora ex notioribus nominamus, et id, quod secunda intentione concipitur, debi-‫׳‬ lissimae entitatis est, extensum est intentionis vocabulum ad id, cui atten ditur et vocatur secunda intentio id, quod intellectus concipit secunda attentione .. -1 I t is w orth noting in this naming process th a t we go from the act to the second intention. We shall see the universal significance of this when we come to talk about manuductio later in this article. N ext, we m ust consider the subject of logic which is said to be second intentions. And since according to the th ird tool of dialectic, it is useful to consider the difference between things th a t are close together, we will compare logic w ith m athem atics which is also about intentional beings and w ith metaphysics, insofar as it can also consider second intentions.
Although both logic and m athem atics consider intentional being (which is why certain moderns have either identified the two or attem pted to reduce one to the other), there are m any im portant differences between them. First, the subject of logic is second inten tions, while th a t of mathem atics is first intentions. A second im portant difference is th a t the logician finds his subject as a result of our way of knowing by abstraction, etc., while the m athem atician makes his as we can see in the operational dem onstrations of geometry. In this respect, the gram m arian who finds his subject is more like the logician th an the mathem atician. From this follows a third difference: although both logic and m athem atics (in the sense of Euclid's Elemevts, of course, not calculation) are properly sciences, the latter has more the notion of a rt th an the former, in th a t construction enters the very act of knowing there (as can be seen in th e ninth book of the Metaphysics of Aristotle) which it does not do in logic. Both m athem atics and logic 1 Quamvis enim logicus intentiones rerum considerat, et non res: principaliter tamen logicus intentiones considerat relatas ad res: et sic considerat res stantes sub intentionibus quas considerat.1 B ut the m athem atician does not consider his intentions relatas ad res even if they can be applied later to sensible things; e.g., the geometer as such does not consider whether his triangle is in things or how it is applicable to them. This fourth difference is clarified by the difference between logic and metaphysics, when the la tte r considers second intentions. I t is not enough to say th a t logic has second intentions for its subject; we m ust also add in w hat way. The same thing m ust be done here as is done in the case of the m athem atical sciences. Their subject is not ade quately described by saying quantity, for the m etaphysician also considers quantity. We have to add in w hat way the m athem atician considers quantity. So too, we m ust here precise the way in which the logician considers his relations or second intentions, since the metaphysician also considers them . The m etaphysician considers the kind of being th a t second intentions have, while the logician m ust consider them in some special way -otherwise, logic would not be a distinct science from metaphysics. The best answer we have found to this rarely discussed question is th a t reported from Avicenna by C ajetan in his com m entary on the Isagoge. Logic is de secundis intentionibus non absolute, ut entia sunt, quoniam huiusmodi metaphysicae speculationis est, sed adiunctis primis, idest, ut fundantur in primis et denominant eas, ita ut, per earum applicationem, rerum, quae primis attentionibus asseruntur, cognitio habeatur.2 This way of defining in logic can be seen in all its definitions. The definition of genus, for example, denom inates animal, etc.; for animal is said of m any differing in species in answer to the question " W hat is it ? " The definition of genus is a definition of a secund intention, not as a kind of being or as a certain type of ens rationis, b u t as it denominates first intentions which in tu rn express things. I t is also easy to see th a t this position of C ajetan and Avicenna is in agreem ent with th a t of St. Albert above. Logic could not consider intentions principally as related to things if it did not consider them as deno m inating first intentions which express things.
This way of considering second intentions is in accordance with, and follows from the traditional conception of logic as a tool of the sciences. The subject of logic is not defined as if it were studied for its own sake; rather it is defined for the sake of knowing things. In fact, its subject comes into existence as a result of our reason's attem p t to know things. T h at is why the discovery of these relations is given by St. Thomas in this order, in the text quoted above: " has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem." The order to things is first, ju st as the order of things to their end is before their order to each other.
The end of knowing things is so im portant in logic th a t we p u t it into the very definitions; e.g., we define definition in term s of knowing w hat a thing is, or enunciation in term s of tru th or falsehood, and dem onstration in term s of our knowing th e cause of a thing's property belonging to it. B ut to return for a m om ent to the fourth difference above between logic and m athem atics: the figures which the geometer constructs in his abstract qu an tity are not considered as founded in sensible things or as denom inating them so th a t we m ay have a knowledge of sensible things through them . And, of course, end or purpose enters neither the definitions, nor the dem onstrations of m athem atics.
I t was necessary to explain a t some length the subject of tra ditional logic so th a t the im pedim ents to understanding it could be seen more clearly. The first im pedim ent can be stated in three degrees, because it is found in a more or less radical form in different thinkers. This impedim ent prevents us from seeing the kind of relations th a t second intentions are. The m ost radical form of this im pedim ent is found in those thinkers who believe th a t all we know about things is w hat we find to belong to them in our knowing powers. If things in themselves are unknowable, it becomes difficult or impossible to distinguish the relations th a t belong to things understood in the state of being understood (i.e., the second intentions) from the relations th a t belong to them in reality or in their proper natures. The second, less general degree ol this impediment, is found in tnose who assert that every sensible per accidens (among which are sensible substances and some relations) is made in the mind or exists only in the mind. The third degree of this im pedim ent is the belief th a t all relations are beings of reason only. Since all relations are known as such only by reason, m any thinkers believe th a t no relations are in the division of real being. If a thinker cannot even distinguish between real relations and relations of reason, he will hardly arrive a t the particular kind of relation of reason th a t is the subject of logic. Since even real relations have so little being, it is easy to fall into this position.
Closely related to the foregoing im pedim ent is one th a t consists in the belief th a t logic is the m ost general study possible of structure and relation. The explanation of the word logic in this belief would be based on the property of reason which is to consider the order or relation of one thing to another. Since the word logic is derived from logos, which in Greek means reason, it would stand for the m ost general possible consideration of order or relation. This impedim ent compounds all the previous ones. I t attem pts to combine in one science relations th a t have only a likeness sufficient for manuductio, not for definition or dem onstration. There is, for example, a likeness between the logical relation of genus to species and the biological relation of a father to his son. Porphyry makes good use of this likeness as a manuductio in his Isagoge, b u t he does not attem p t to make these two relations fall under the subject of one science. One can see m any similarities between these two relations th a t help to manifest some thing about genus and species through the more known relations of father and son. Thus, for example, as the same man can be both a father and a son at the same tim e, b u t only in reference to different persons, so the same thing can be both a genus and a species, b u t only in reference to different things. B ut this sort of likeness does not enable one to p u t them in the same science. The scientific consideration of order or relation belongs to the science which considers the proper cause, or foundation, or subject of th a t relation. The relation of father to son has its foundation in the act of generation, which is considered in natural science. O ther relations are founded on quantity, such as those considered in geom etry or the science of numbers. Y et other relations are based on acts of will which are considered in moral science. There are still other kinds of relation based on other subjects, b u t logic (if it is a science) can consider only those relations which are based on things understood in the state of being understood. This is why the universal, and predicability which follows upon it, are the first things considered in traditional logic. This brings us to a third impediment to understanding the subject of traditional logic.
We saw above th a t the logician considers second intentions as they denominate first intentions and, hence, as they are useful for knowing things. This agrees with the end of logic; i.e., with its being a tool rather something to be studied for its own sake. B ut for m any modern thinkers, logic is no more a tool than is pure m athem atics for the middle sciences. Although pure m athem atics can be applied to natural phenomena, it can still be studied for its own sake. Pure m athem atics is not intrinsically a tool. B u t traditional logic was always regarded as being intrinsically a tool. Hence, the subject of logic cannot be regarded as separated from first intentions or from things in the way th a t the subject of pure m athem atics is separated from sensible or natural phenomena. B ut this is precisely how some modern logicians regard it. This, then, is a m ost serious impedim ent to recognizing the subject of traditional logic. We can see how it also includes the impediment from the end. We shall now pass to a consideration of the im pediments concerning the special m ethod or way of proceeding in logic.
The consideration of the m ethod of a science appropriately follows a determ ination of its subject, since the method of a science m ust be determ ined in conformity to the subject of th a t science and the relation of our mind to th a t subject. In the rem ainder of this article, we wish to note im pediments to three extremely im portant elements in the special m ethod of acquiring logic. The consideration hitherto given to this proper m ethod does not seem to us to be a t all com m ensurate to its im portance. (Nor will our consideration give due justice to it.) Perhaps this is due to the fact th a t our attention is usually riveted to logic's role with respect to the other sciences or w ith respect to all the sciences. However, this should only m ake us more aware of the im portance of logic's proper method. The latter has a double im portance: one due to the general fact th a t the proper method of any science is a universal principle of th a t science, and the second due to the fact th a t the science here in consideration is a universal principle of all the sciences, treating as it does th eir common way of proceeding.
We shall consider three elements in the proper or special m ethod of acquiring logic and the im pedim ents opposed to them. The three elements are the term to which judgm ents in logic resolve, the manuductio appropriate to its subject, and the order of determ ination, especially as regards its first p art. The im portance of the first of these elements is shown by the fact th a t judgm ent is the m ost essential act in science or, rather, the act th a t completes or defines science. The importance of the second elem ent can be seen, in general, from the fact th a t St. Thomas p uts it even before the proposing of the order of principles to their conclusions as the work of a teacher in communic ating a science.1 We shall consider the term of resolution in logic first because it will illuminate one of the reasons why manuductio in logic is so crucial. The im portance of the order of determ ination is indicated by its presence in the introduction to traditional logic.2 I t is not easy to imagine a more disastrous error about the m ethod of a science than to make a m istake about the term to which its judg m ents resolve. Science, in the strictest sense of the word, is defined in term s of resolution. The two treatises of Aristotle in logic dealing w ith science take their names from the Greek word for resolution. Some attention to this subject has been paid in regard to the three speculative or theoretical sciences; i.e., n atu ral science, m athem atics, and metaphysics. This is perhaps due to our possession of B oethius' masterful treatm en t of the term s of resolution in these three sciences. B ut there seems to be a surprising neglect of the question in regard 1 . Ia, q . 1 1 7 , a . l , c . 2. See, for example, S t. T h o m a s , In I Post. Anal., l e c t . 1. to the science of logic. Y et the im portance of such a consideration would be hard to overestimate, because the whole of logic depends upon it and all other sciences depend upon logic. There is hardly a problem or misunderstanding about any of the parts of traditional logic whose solution or correction does not involve an understanding of the term to which the judgm ents of th a t science resolve. And, it is certain th a t no profound understanding of traditional logic is possible to anyone ignorant of the same. In w hat follows, we shall attem p t to show briefly the term to which the judgm ents of logic should resolve and, secondly, to illustrate a b it its indispensable role in an understanding of the parts of logic. In so doing, we shall have opportunity to note impediments to logic.
All of the elements of the proper m ethod of a science are dictated by the subject of th a t science and the relation of our mind to th a t subject. If th a t famous answer is correct which states th a t the subject of logic is second intentions, then there would seem to be dictated a certain term to which the judgm ents of logic m ust resolve. Since second intentions are relations which reason finds in things understood in the very state of being understood, the term of resolution in logic cannot be sense as in n atural science, nor im agination as in m athem a tics, but only the reason or intellect itself. This is also shown by the relation of our reason to th a t subject. Our reason is able to consider this subject due to its (reason's) ability to reflect upon itself.
The indispensable role of this term of resolution can be illustrated in the very beginning of logic. St. Albert is reflecting, we believe, the tradition in logic th a t begins with Aristotle and flows down through three great groups of com mentators when he says th a t the first thing to be considered in logic is the universal: " Prim um autem quod in scientia logica considerandum est, universale e st." 1 Indeed, if a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood, then logic, which considers those relations which belong to things under stood in the state of being understood, m ust begin with some under standing of the universal. The im possibility of understanding this w ithout resolving to the intellect is well shown in the following passage from the Parmenides of Plato. Parm enides is questioning Socrates:
' But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; th at similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity, and great things become great because they partake of great ness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful because they partake of justice and beauty ? ‫׳‬ 'Yes, certainly,' said Socrates, 'that is my meaning.' 'Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea ? Can there be any other mode of participation ? ' ' There cannot b e / he said. ' Then do you think that the whole idea, is one, and yet, being one, is in each of the many ? ' ' Why not, Parmenides ? ' said Socrates. ' Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation from itself. ' 'Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once, and yet continuous with itself, in this way each idea may be one and the same in all at the same time. ' ' I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, there would be one whole including many -is not th at your meaning ? ' ' I think so.' 'And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only, and different parts different men ? ' 'The latter.' 'Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them ? ' ' That seems to follow.'1
Although this problem is not, strictly speaking, the logical problem, it can easily be assimilated to the la ttsr. In trying to grasp the universal whole and explain it, Socrates falls back upon the sensible integral whole th a t the senses and im agination attain to. Although certainly not completely ignorant of the universal, Socrates is unable to resolve to the intellect, as he m ust do to judge properly of its nature. Instead, he falls back upon his senses and imagination, thus getting into all kinds of difficulties. This marvelous passage a t once points out the difficulty and the necessity of resolving to the intellect in logic. We find the difficulty of Socrates in this passage in contem porary confusion of the universal with the class. The latter, a collective whole, can be attained by the im agination while the former is grasped only by the intellect. The five universals or the five predicables lie a t the foundation of logic, as Porphyry has so well shown in his Isagoge. We have al ready seen th a t a proper understanding of the universal in traditional logic requires resolution to the intellect. B ut we can see this more particularly when we enter into the details of the five predicables. One common way of failing to resolve to the intellect in logic is the confusion of the universal w ith the class. The class or collection, which is not said of the members it contains taken separately (as crowd is not said of any individual in it), can be attained by the imagi nation, b u t the universal as such, never. We can see in particular th a t the difference between genus and the ultim ate species is destroyed when we conceive of them as classes rath er than as universals. This can be seen in a couple of passages of St. A lbert on the difference between the relation of the genus to the species and th a t of the species to the individuals:
Nec potest esse genus unius speciei contentivum: eo quod species non exit a genere, nisi per oppositas differentias divisivas: quae (cum eductae fuerint a genere) plures et oppositas constituent species de necessitate. Non sic autem se habet species ad individuum. Non enim species sui divisione constituit individuum, sed totum est in individuo per substantiam et potestatem: unde materiae determinatione ex accidente individuante individuatur. 1 The other passage is the following:
Alia enim potestate genus est in specie una, et alia in alia: et non talis divisio est speciei per materiam: eadem enim potestate species est in uno individuo et in alio, nec est divisa, sed secundum esse integrum manente sua naturali potestate est in quolibet individuorum.2 Such radical and essential differences between the genus and the species (the infima species, of course) would be wholly ignored or misunderstood if we conceive of the genus as a collection of species and the species as a collection of individuals. In th a t case, the relation of genus to species and th a t of species to individuals would be roughly the same. I t would make no sense to say th a t the genus constitutes the species by the division of itself, and not the species, similarly, the individuals. Or to say th a t the whole power of the species is in each individual, while the power of the genus is other in each species, or th a t the whole power of the genus is not realized in each species.
... individua in quibus omnibus est ipsa species secundum totum suum esse et secundum totam suam potestatem. Hoc autem modo ... non est genus in speciebus: in nulla enim species secundum se est genus secundum totum ambitum suae potestatis. 3 H aving given examples from the foundations of logic to illustrate a b it the crucial role of resolution to the intellect in th a t science, we can now tu rn to some examples from the principal parts of th a t science. A ristotle's Prior Analytics is especially im portant for illus trating our principle, not only because it considers so im portant a p art of logic, b u t especially because this p a rt is the place where, characteristically and most often, people in our day fail to resolve to the intellect.
There is a great danger of resolving to the im agination when considering the syllogism. When this is done, the syllogism is consider ed as if it were a m athem atical form. The language used even in tradi tional logic could be misunderstood in this m atbem atical sense. This is most easily seen when we consider the relation of the syllogism to dem onstration and the dialectical syllogism. The form of the syllogism as studied in the Prior Analytics could be th o u g h t of as abstracted from and applicable to diverse m atters (as the necessary in dem onstration and the probable in dialectic) in much the same way as a m athem atical form is abstracted from and applicable to wood or clay or some other sensible m atter. W hen this is done, form al logic is thought to be the whole of logic; just as arithm etic and geome try are complete sciences in themselves although they can be applied to some sensible m atter in a scientia media. The very language used in traditional formal logic could be misunderstood in this sense. Take, for example, the words of St. Albert in his com m entary on the Prior Analytics:
... nos enim hie loquimur de syllogismo simplici et formali, qui abstrahitur ab omni materia et demonstrativa et dialectica et sophistica, et tantum consideratur in ipsa syllogismi simplicis forma.1
If this abstraction were assimilated to th a t found in m athem atics (as it certainly would be if we were resolving to the im agination rather than to the intellect), then the application of this form would also be understood in a m athem atical sense. Thus, when St. Albert says, taking about the form of the syllogism, th a t " m ateria cui ilia form a primo applicabilis est, duplex est, scilicet necessaria e t probabilis" ,2 this application of the syllogistic form to necessary or probable m atter would be like th a t made in a scientia media where a m athem atical form is applied to sensible m atter. Once this is accept ed, it becomes merely consistent to conceive of formal logic as the whole of logic. This is, indeed, w hat m any have done.
The traditional logicians, of course, did not consider the abstrac tion of the Prior Analytics to be like th a t of mathem atics. They regard ed dem onstration and the dialectical syllogism as true species of the syllogism; just as the isosceles triangle and the equilateral one are true species of triangle, unlike the wooden and m etal triangles which add accidental differences, not constituting species. St. Albert puts it th u s : uterque enim, scilicet et qui demonstrat et qui consensus interrogat, syllogizant, et unus syllogismus simplex et formalis est demonstrativus et dialecticus, quamvis non sit una species materialis syllogismi in utroque 1 istorum, sed unum sunt in forma simplicis syllogism¡, sicut isosceles et isopleurus sunt una figura, quamvis non sint unus triangulus .. .* But, to see th a t dem onstration and dialectical syllogism are true species of the syllogism, we m ust first see th a t the differences which they add to the formal syllogism determ ine w hat is intrinsic to the nature or definition of the formal syllogism, for this is required in all species-making differences. B ut here, again, whoever understands the syllogism in im aginative term s m ust fail to grasp w hat the syllogism is in strictly logical term s which requires resolution to the intellect. And, unless we achieve this latter, we shall never see how the differen ces of dem onstration and the dialectical syllogism determine the nature of syllogism intrinsically as, e.g., isosceles and equilateral clearly determine the nature of triangle.
Let us turn, then, to considering the problem of resolving to the intellect in the consideration of the formal syllogism and, afterwards, we can better consider its relation to the dialectical and dem onstrative syllogisms. The figures of the formal syllogism seem to be, historically, a frequent occasion for the mistake of resolving to the imagination rather than to the intellect in logic. The word figure is prom inent in m athematics, and it seems so tem pting to consider logical figures quasi-m athem atically. This is where the " fo u rth figure" enters in. Whoever posits a " fourth figure" for the syllogism is giving a certain sign th a t he is resolving to the im agination rath er th an to the intellect. Im aginatively speaking, one can of course arrange those three letters in these four ways, b u t this doesn't am ount to there being four figures in the intellect as such. This becomes clear when we go back to the definition of the syllogism and investigate the nature of its two pro positions in the light of th a t definition.
The definition of the syllogism makes quite explicit th a t the propositions or premises of the syllogism have the nature of causes with respect to the conclusion. In fact, this is inseparable from them considered as premises or propositions. B u t the m ajor and the minor premises are not causes of the conclusion equally or in the same way. This is w hat makes the syllogism so much more difficult to under stand than induction. In the latter, the singular instances by which we progress tow ard the universal conclusion are all equally causes of the conclusion or related to it in the same way. The inequality and the diverse causality of the premises is already contained in the principles of the syllogism -the diet de omni and the d id de nullo. The m ajor premise or proposition has the aspect of a prior and more universal (in causando) cause of the conclusion while the minor premise has the aspect of a posterior or proxim ate cause with respect to the conclusion. There is a likeness here to the parts of a definition which are also uneven, or not on the same level w ith respect to the definition; i.e., which are n o t equally related to the thing defined. To make the likeness more explicit, we can compare the m ajor premise w ith the genus and the minor premise with the difference. As the difference contracts the genus to this species, so the universal power of the m ajor premise is applied through the minor premise to this conclusion. In the so-called fourth figure, however, the m ajor premise does not have the aspect of a universal cause or of th a t from which the syllogistic movement proceeds.
W hen we examine the way Aristotle uses letters in the Prior Analytics (Bk. I, Chs. 4-6), we can see th a t he guards us against the possibility of resolving to the im agination in regard to the three figures. He uses nine letters rath er th an the three we usually employ. We tend to use the letters A, B, and C for the m ajor, middle and minor term s respectively in all the figures. B ut, since the order of term s in universality is different in each figure, this order of letters and term s corresponds only to the first figure. If we w anted the order of letters to correspond to the order of term s in the second and third figures, we would have to use the letter A for the middle term in the second figure (B for the m ajor and C for the minor) and C for the middle term in the third figure (A for the m ajor and B for the minor). However, it is less confusing to take another set of three consecutive letters for the second figure and likewise for the third, as Aristotle does. Thus, doing in our alphabet w hat Aristotle did in his, we m ight take the letters M , N , and 0 for the middle, m ajor and minor term s respectively in the second figure and X , Y and Z for the m ajor, minor and middle term s respectively of the third figure. Aristotle is more careful than we are in the use of letters to guard us against the serious error of regarding them as symbols which can be m anipulated in the im agination in four ways.
Let us return to the earlier problem of the relation of the formal syllogism to dem onstration and the dialectical syllogism. Do the la tter add differences th a t contract w hat is intrinsic to the definition of the syllogism ? Since the conclusion of a syllogism is derived from the premises, we should examine these differences in regard to the premises. The Greek word Aristotle chose for premise has the original meaning of a stretching forward. In English, we speak of reaching a conclusion by our premises. Our reason stretches forward to the conclusion, or reaches it by means of the premises. This is why the instances from which we make an induction cannot be properly called premises: they do not enable our reason to stretch as far as the universal statem ent; the latter we merely assume after so m any instances w ithout an exception. If our mind stretches forward to the conclusion b y the premises, then to be placed before the conclusion in our mind is intrinsic to the definition of premise. B u t we do not find the same kind of placing before in the dem onstrative premise and in the dialectical one. In dialectic, we place those statem ents th a t are accepted as probable before the conclusions th a t can be drawn from them. I t is through our acceptance of their probability th a t they can be placed before other statem ents which can be reached through them (provided, of course, they are suitably disposed in figure and mood of the syllogism). B ut we place the dem onstrative premise before its conclusion because the evident tru th of the former already forces our mind to assent to it while the la tte r does not necessitate any such assent by itself. I t is difficult to see how these radical differ ences could be considered accidental or not intrinsic to w hat a premise is. The premise in dem onstration of itself or from the necessity of the thing stretches forward to the conclusion, while th a t in dialectic does so through our consent. St. Albert is well w orth quoting on this p o in t:
Unde in hoc differt propositio demonstrativa a dialectica quoniam de monstrativa propositio est sumptio alterius partis contradictionis quae cumque est vera et necessaria: non enim interrogat respondentis consensum, sed ex ipsa rei veritate et necessitate sumat quasi concessam ille qui de monstrat. Dialectica vero propositio non sic sumi potest: quia non habet rei certitudinem, sed ex consensu procedit respondentis: et ideo dialectica propositio est cum interrogatione alterius partis contradictionis quomodo cumque scilicet concedere velit respondens. Hujus autem vera causa est: quia necessitas in propositione non est ab homine, sed a re ipsa: probabilitas autem erit ab homine: probabile enim est, quod videtur omnibus aut pluribus aut maxime notis: et ideo in probabilibus oportet quod habeatur respondientis condisputantis nobiscum concensus.1
If we have essentially different kinds of premises, then we have true species of syllogism. B u t true species are to be considered in the same science. Hence there can be no question of making formal logic the whole of even the logic of the third act of reason.
Resolving to the imagination is an im pedim ent th a t destroys logic. The current confusions of logic with m athem atics and with gram m ar are constant reminders th a t this im pedim ent is with us. So also are those textbooks of logic which teach the " fourth figure" or use circles in the explanation of the syllogism.
An understanding of the subject of logic and of the term to which its judgm ents resolve, enables us to appreciate the g reat difficulty of this science. I t is only in a com paratively easy science as geometry or arithm etic (where the subject is well proportioned to us) th a t it seems in any way sufficient for the teacher to proceed by defining, dividing, enunciating obvious propositions and dem onstrating. In other sciences, such as natural science and m etaphysics, it is not sufficient for the teacher to propose or show to the student the defini tions, demonstrations, etc., which make up th a t science. The student can, of course, be given words to memorize, b u t this is not teaching -it is in fact worse th an not teaching the student a t all. The role of the teacher here should be above all to prepare the mind of the student for an eventual reception with understanding of those definitions, dem onstrations, etc. This preparation requires th a t the teacher, after having himself mastered the definitions, dem onstrations, etc., search carefully for the proper means of proportioning them to the minds of the students. This intellectual leading by the hand, or manuductio as it is called in Latin, will have to fit the subject of the science in question and the stu d en t's relation to th a t subject. I t is our pur pose now to consider the need for th a t intellectual leading by the hand in logic and to show something about how it m ight be carried out.
We are in need of being led by the hand in those things which are difficult for us. B ut logic has the greatest difficulty. " Logica habet maximam difficultatem " is the statem ent of one of the most famous of the traditional logicians. B u t St. Thom as always uses words in a precise fashion. W hy then does he attrib u te the greatest difficulty to logic? Aristotle, the founder of logic, had w ritten of two sources of difficulty in the sciences. In a famous passage in Bk. I I of the Metaphysics/ he had distinguished the difficulty due to the weakness of our mind from th a t resulting from the weakness in being (and hence in knowability) of the object. Thus it is th a t both m etaphysics and natural science are much more difficult th an m athem atics, b u t for different reasons. In the former case, the principal difficulty is in the weakness of our mind, which derives its knowledge from sensible things th a t are intelligible only in potency, and which cannot think w ithout images, while the subjects of th a t science transcend the imagination and are in themselves most knowable or intelligible. In the case of natural science however, the principal difficulty is due to the deficient m anner of being or existing of such things as m atter, motion and time which are involved in all natu ral things. B u t the subjects of mathem atics are abstracted from m atter, motion and time, while they are proportioned to our mind and fall under our im agination in one way or another. Logic, however, seems to share in both kinds of difficulty. Logic has something of the difficulty of metaphysics in th a t logic m ust resolve to the intellect and avoid being led astray by the imagination. B ut it also shares in the difficulty due to the weakness in being of its subject. Even real relations are so weak in being th a t m any men, among the modem s as well as the ancients, think th a t they are only beings of reason. B u t the relations of logic, second intentions, have even less being th a n real relations. Hence, the difficulty of knowing them on account of the weakness of their being is magnified. If logic has this double difficulty which is compounded by the fact th a t logic is to be ta u g h t to beginners in the intellectual life, then even more so than n atu ral science or m etaphysics will it require an intellectual leading by the hand. We shall next a ttem p t to sketch something of the nature of the manuductio required in logic.
One of the most im portant texts for a general understanding of manuductio is the following from the Prima P a rs:
Ducit autem magister discipulum ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter. Primo quidem, proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam: puta cum proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis ignotae.
We shall now exemplify the application of this doctrine to the teaching of logic.
Geometry, which involves im agination and can be learned in some way even by boys, can serve well to lead us by the hand through examples to an understanding of the doctrine on dem onstration in the Posterior Analytics, as A ristotle's choice of examples there shows us. Rhetoric can in m any ways dispose our m ind to understand dialectic which is less known to us. This is because of the likeness of one to the other. Both are capable of arguing on opposite sides of a question; and our experience of the u tility of this in the courtroom or in political life prepares us to see the same in the universal questions of dialectical discussion. There is some likeness of rhetorical places to those places th a t give their nam e to A ristotle's treatise on dialectic (the Topics). The art of cross-examination in the courtroom is very much like w hat Socrates was trying to do w ith dialectic. One can be led to state the principles of the categorical syllogism -the d id de omni and the d id de nullo -by the opposite cases of example and induction and the enthymeme which are closer to sense and our daily experience. When we ask the student why these la tte r forms do not conclude of necessity, he comes up with w hat they lack and would require in order to conclude necessarily. In this way, the student of logic is led by the hand to the principles of a form of argum ent whose conclusion follows necessarily. There are abundant possibilities for manuductio through similia between the parts of logic concerning the simple and the complex unknown. For exam ple: ju st as one cannot prove every proposition from previous ones, so one cannot define everything; hence, the necessity of im m ediate propositions is analogous to the necessity of the predicam ents (the categories of Aristotle).
We have not yet touched upon w hat are perhaps the most im p o rtan t means or tools of manuductio in logic. One can be led by the hand to a second intention by the analogy of a word which applies to something close to the senses to begin with, and which has been later applied to a second intention because of a certain likeness of it to the original sensible thing. Thus, Porphyry, in his Isagoge, leads us to the second intentions of genus and species through the sensible im positions of these words. This kind of tool is usually ignored today. Sometimes one can be led to the second intention through the act of reason which founds it. We have made use of this tool in the present article. We can, of course, use the analogy of the word for getting a t the acts which are usually named from sensible acts, such as grasping, dividing, showing, etc. Finally, one can be led to an understanding of a speculative act of the reason through a corresponding act in the practical reason, as when an analysis of counsel illuminates us about dialectical reasoning.
Lack of manuductio in the teaching of logic is so general th a t it is found even in those who would be described as traditional logicians. This great impediment to the whole of logic dates from the late scho lastics. Of course in practice, it is very hard to teach a logic course with the proper manuductio in one semester to students who have not had grammar, rhetoric, geometry, etc., in a sufficiently rigorous way.
The most common impediment to the order of determ ination in logic consists in neglecting the first act of reason and its fundam ental place in the whole of logic. This has become common-place since the rise and dominance of kinds of knowledge in which there is never achieved definitions of things, b u t only symbols, syndromes and other such concepts as are justified only by their consequences. This impediment combines with the impedim ent to judgm ent in logic which m ust resolve all the way back to the predicables.
We have attem pted in this article to enum erate in an orderly way some of the main impediments to traditional logic. These impediments prevent m any from understanding traditional logic as the traditional logicians themselves understood it. The question of w hether the traditional logicians understood the nature of logic well or sufficiently, is a question th a t can be suitably raised only after we know how they understood it. B ut the la tter is impossible so long as we are under the influence of any of the above impediments.
In concluding, we would like to remind the reader th a t our consideration here has been only an outline which needs to be filled in. However, such a rough approxim ation as this m ay be useful in opening the door to a more thorough consideration. We should also like to acknowledge our debt to monsignor M aurice Dionne, of Laval University, for the seeds th a t developed into this article, although
